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Abstract: In the mid-1980s the National Action Committee on the Status of Women (NAC) was 
considered the main “face” of the Canadian women’s movement and a major player in Canadian politics.  
However, by the end of the decade, NAC began losing crucial federal funding and suffered internal 
divisions amongst member groups.  By the 2000s, NAC slowly became a less relevant feminist political 
advocate and has since completely disappeared from Canadian politics.  This paper explains the decline 
and disappearance of NAC from the 1980s to the present day to help understand the state of the national-
level women’s movement in Canada.  Drawing largely on the political opportunity structure approach and 
a neo-institutional focus on changes in federalism and the rise of neoliberal ideas in Canada, the paper 
argues with NAC gone, opportunities for the emergence of a new national voice for Canadian women are 
limited at best.  Even though this does not in and of itself signify an end to organized feminism in the 
country, it does not bode well for the health of the national-level women’s movement. 
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Resumé: 
Au milieu des années 1980, le Comité canadien d'action sur le statut de la femme (NAC) était 
perçu comme un emblème du mouvement féministe canadien et un joueur majeur de la politique 
canadienne. Cependant, dès la fin de cette décennie, le NAC commença à perdre des subventions 
fédérales cruciales et souffrit de divisions parmi ses associations affiliées. Au cours des années 
2000, le NAC perdit de son influence et, depuis, est complètement disparu de la scène politique 
canadienne. Ce texte explique les raisons du déclin et de la disparition du NAC, des années 1980 
à aujourd'hui, pour aider à mieux comprendre l'état du mouvement féministe canadien à l'échelle 
nationale. S'appuyant surtout sur une approche de structure des opportunités politiques dans un 
contexte institutionnel de changement du fédéralisme et de croissance des idées néo-libérales au 
Canada, ce texte estime que les opportunités d'émergence d'une nouvelle voix pour les femmes 
canadiennes sont, au mieux, limitées. Quoique cela ne signifie pas en soi la fin du féminisme 
organisé au pays, cela n'est pas de bon augure pour le mouvement féministe à l'échelle nationale. 
 
Mots-clés: 
Comité canadien d'action sur le statut de la femme; néo-libérales; le mouvement féministe 
 
 
 
Canadian Political Science Review Vol. 8, No.2, 2014, 17-33 
 
18 
 
 
 
Academic and popular media studies 
addressing the supposed death of feminism and 
related pronounced declines in women’s 
movement activity, like the proverbial ‘bad 
penny,’ always seem to turn up.  When Ginia 
Belefante asked “Is Feminism Dead?” in a 
1998 Time magazine cover story, as if posing 
the question for the first time, Time had already 
run 119 articles with a similar theme over the 
previous 25 years (Jong 1998).  Feminist 
scholars have also lamented the state of the 
women’s movement, particularly since the 
1980s and 90s with the rise of neoliberalism in 
Western democracies and accompanying 
feminist backlash and post-feminist politics 
(see for example Epstein 2001).  When all is 
said and done, however, most come to the 
conclusion that even though feminist women’s 
movements in liberal democracies have gone 
through periods or “waves” of low key and less 
visible activity, those movements do not cease 
to exist and feminism remains alive and well 
(Staggenborg and Taylor 2005, Chappell 2002, 
Nash 2002, Tanguay and Newman 2002).   
In Canada, similar hand-wringing about 
the state of feminism and the national women’s 
movement has been evident.
1
  Most, if not all, 
of these examinations have been spurred by the 
failing health of the country’s first and largest 
national women’s organization, the National 
Action Committee on the Status of Women 
(NAC).  In the early to mid-1980s, NAC was 
heralded as a strong voice for women that could 
legitimately communicate common feminist 
concerns to the national government while 
simultaneously acting as “an embryonic 
parliament of women” in all of its ethnic, 
ideological and linguistic diversity (Vickers, 
Rankin and Appelle 1993:4).  Yet by the end of 
the decade, NAC entered an era of significant 
changes, including a gradual and ultimately 
complete loss of state funding alongside 
internal divisions which left it broke and 
struggling to survive, particularly between 2001 
and 2005.  In 2006, NAC reportedly was on the 
mend and the familiar pattern of premature 
pronouncements of its death, so common to 
women’s movements in a variety of political 
contexts, appeared to be repeating itself.  Or 
was it?  It is the purpose of this paper to 
examine the decline of NAC that has occurred 
primarily from the late 1980s to 2014.  Is 
NAC’s role as a leader of the Canadian 
women’s movement effectively over?  Or will 
it or a similar national feminist organization be 
able to re-emerge as a strong federalist 
advocate for the Canadian women’s 
movement?   
In order to understand the 
metamorphosis of NAC, the paper will employ 
the political opportunity structure approach to 
social movement politics.  Louise Chappell has 
argued that in order to understand distinctions 
between the success levels of different 
women’s movements in different states, it is 
essential to understand distinctions in state 
political opportunity structures (2002:35).  
Relatedly, shifts in political opportunity 
structures within states over time help us 
understand success levels of a movement over 
that same period.  Even though NAC is not by 
itself equivalent to the Canadian women’s 
movement, it has been its largest and most 
visible member and thus it is possible to draw 
some generalities about the state of the 
Canadian movement from NAC’s experiences.   
This paper will specifically focus on 
two central aspects of NAC’s political 
opportunity structure: one institutional and the 
other ideational.  Specifically, the paper will 
examine the shifting nature of federalism and 
its impact on social policy-making in Canada (a 
key lobbying focus of the Canadian women’s 
movement at the national level) and shifts in 
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the dominant political ideology of the state, 
specifically the rise of neo-liberalism and post 
neo-liberalism and how this has impacted the 
degree of openness of the state to women’s 
interests (Tarrow in Smith 2005:39).  In so 
doing, the paper will argue that the growing 
paucity of positive political opportunities 
available to NAC has effectively rendered 
pronouncements of its re-emergence as 
premature and actually helps explain a more 
permanent state of demise.  This leads me to 
conclude that the broader national level 
Canadian women’s movement presently should 
be concerned about its future unless it or 
something or someone else can change the state 
of those political opportunities.   
To illustrate these arguments, the paper 
will begin by briefly outlining the political 
opportunity structure approach and why and 
how it will be used to analyze NAC activity 
since the 1980s.  I have chosen to begin the 
study in the 1980s at a time when NAC was 
considered to be a strong force in Canadian 
politics in order to contrast the political 
opportunity structure during that period to the 
one that was in place later during years of 
decline.  The paper will then document shifts 
and changes in institutional (federalism) and 
ideational (neoliberal/post-neoliberal) contexts 
for this time frame.  It will move to an 
empirical examination of NAC’s history 
utilizing the political opportunity structure 
approach to help explain changes within the 
organization itself and its ability to act as a 
legitimate advocate for women’s interests.  It 
will conclude by answering the questions posed 
above and considering the future of the national 
level women’s movement in Canada. 
 
The Political Opportunity Structure 
Approach 
 The concept of the political opportunity 
structure was first introduced by Sidney Tarrow 
(1983; 1998) to help understand why social 
movements move through cycles of contention 
where they are sometimes more visible and 
successful in their activism and at other times 
are less visible and less successful.  Tarrow 
argues that these political opportunities are 
external to the groups involved in contentious 
politics and largely outside of their control, 
although others acknowledge that social 
movements and groups can at times alter those 
political opportunities to suit their own needs 
(Gelb 1989; Chappell 2002).  Thus Tarrow 
contends that political opportunities in the form 
of “state structures and political cleavages 
create relatively stable opportunities” with the 
most obvious ones being “institutions and 
capacity for repression” (1998:20).  Changes in 
political opportunities, then, can create 
important “openings” for groups and social 
movements to utilize in order to engage in 
contentious action (Ibid).  The removal of 
previously positive political opportunities 
conversely can frustrate movement action. 
Thus, social movement activity is often cyclical 
in nature.  As the cycle widens, opportunities 
for alliances between state and movement 
actors are created.  Then when the cycle ends, 
the power to repress or reform movements 
shifts to state elites, and movements disappear 
as their issues are either accepted by the public 
at large or are discredited.  This leaves 
movement actors to correspondingly be 
absorbed into power structures or to drop out of 
the public eye (Newman and Tanguay 
2002:403).  It is important to note that during 
downturns in cyclical activity, social 
movements often do not cease to exist, even 
though this is sometimes the end result.  Instead 
they tend to fall into a period of latency where 
they are still active, particularly focusing on 
internal identity work, but are less visible to 
society (Melucci in Newman and Tanguay 
2002:404; Bagguley in Sawer 2006:120). 
 It is easy to see how the political 
opportunity structure approach and the cycle of 
contentious politics can help us understand the 
waves or cycles of women’s movement activity 
in Canada and other Western democracies, 
briefly highlighted above.  Because of this, the 
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approach is often employed by researchers 
studying feminist movement activity even 
though they can also be critical of its ability to 
explain the entirety of that activism (Gelb 1989, 
Bashevkin 2000, Young 2000, Chappell 2002).  
Therefore, while acknowledging the limitations 
in the approach, this paper will use it to help 
uncover the changing success levels of the 
Canadian women’s movement since the 1980s 
focusing on a case study of NAC.  Limitations 
of time and space mean that it would be 
impossible to map out all of the various 
opportunities available to NAC and the wider 
Canadian women’s movement between the 
over 30 years under review, therefore I have 
chosen to focus on two specific aspects of that 
structure.  One is institutional and the other is 
ideational, yet both are related as changes in 
dominant ideology have arguably impacted 
changes in relevant political institutions.  I have 
chosen to focus on institutions and ideas 
following from a neo-institutional approach to 
understanding actors and decision-making 
inside the policy process.
2
  Because much of 
the women’s movement, and specifically 
NAC’s, state-focussed activism has been aimed 
at impacting public policy, an examination of 
the institutional and ideational openings for the 
movement to access policy-making processes 
can help us understand how successful the 
movement and NAC can be in its lobbying 
efforts.   Changes in social movement political 
opportunities shape the strategies of movement 
actors, the negotiation of their collective 
identities and the policy outcomes they are able 
to secure (Orsini in Smith 2005:39).  According 
to Chappell, formal political institutions can 
provide openings or serve as obstacles to 
movement lobbying efforts (2002:9).  
Accessing opportunities can also be affected by 
state ideological contexts which can either 
facilitate lobbying efforts or resist them.   
 In Canada the institution of federalism 
is of key importance when women’s movement 
actors attempt to influence the social policy 
arena.  Constitutionally, many areas of social 
policy (for example, health care and education) 
fall under provincial jurisdiction, but the 
federal government has also historically 
impacted these policy arenas in the name of the 
national interest through fiscal federal 
arrangements.  These arrangements and the 
willingness of the federal government to play a 
guiding role in social policy delivery have 
changed significantly over the time frame under 
study.  This has had a major impact on national 
women’s movement activism and arguably 
helps us understand the struggles NAC have 
experienced remaining relevant as a national 
lobbying voice for women in Canada.  
Relatedly, ideological changes in state 
willingness to sustain the welfare state over 
time have also had significant impacts on 
women’s movement activism in social policy 
arenas.  Therefore, the paper will focus on each 
in turn to help understand how changing 
political opportunity structures have 
increasingly had a detrimental impact on 
movement activism. 
 
The Changing Federal Context of Social 
Policymaking 
 Federalism has not remained static since 
it was first adopted in Canada and enshrined in 
the Constitution Act 1867.  Many who 
chronicle the changes in federal arrangements 
between the national and meso 
(provincial/municipal) levels of government 
typify it as moving through periods of 
centralization (where the federal government 
was more powerful and able to exercise 
influence in areas of provincial jurisdiction) to 
periods of greater decentralization (where the 
federal and provincial levels of government 
have grown to share power more independently 
of one another, more closely following the 
delineation of powers in the written 
constitution).  The advent of the welfare state 
after World War II has generally been seen to 
increase the influence of the federal 
government over areas of provincial 
jurisdiction through the use of the federal 
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spending power and specifically the advent of 
shared-cost programs in the 1960s and 70s 
(Cameron and Simeon 2002:50; Adam 2007).  
Cameron and Simeon refer to this era as one of 
cooperative federalism where “close 
professional relationships developed among 
provincial and federal officials and ministers 
within specific policy areas” (2002:50).  Thus 
programs such as National Medicare and the 
Canada Assistance Plan were created and both 
levels of government had a say (to varying 
extents) in the development and nature of social 
policy under the welfare state umbrella.   
 However, over time, this more co-
operative form of federalism gave way to a 
more collaborative version of federalism where 
competition between levels of government 
became increasingly apparent and national 
policy goals were achieved, “not by the federal 
government acting alone or by the federal 
government shaping provincial behaviour 
through the exercise of its spending power, but 
by some or all of the 11 governments and the 
territories acting collectively” (Cameron and 
Simeon 2002: 54).  Thus federalism moved 
from a more centralized model to one where 
decentralized decision-making was more 
commonplace.  Accordingly, the federal 
government began to lose the ability to easily 
intervene in areas of social policy that fell 
under provincial jurisdiction.  Changes in 
shared cost program spending under the Canada 
Assistance Plan - a 50/50 split in expenditures 
on programs such as child care, anti-violence 
programs and welfare programs shared between 
the federal and provincial levels of government 
– began in earnest in 1990 with a cap on CAP 
payments to the three richest provinces 
(Ontario, BC and Alberta) and culminated in 
the replacement of CAP altogether in 1997 with 
the reduced and amalgamated Canada Health 
and Social Transfer (CHST).
3
   
Since 2006, the federal Conservative 
government has adopted what it refers to as 
“open federalism”.  While any distinctions 
between collaborative and open federalism are 
still largely undocumented, the 2007 
Conservative budget stated its intention to 
respect the constitutional division of powers 
and to avoid treading on areas of clear 
provincial responsibility, particularly in the 
area of social policy.  Thus the federal 
government promised to not act unilaterally in 
areas of social program delivery but would 
instead ask for majority provincial consent 
ahead of time and to allow the provinces the 
ability to opt out and receive compensation 
provided they offer “similar programs with 
comparable accountability structures” 
(Courchene 2007:17).  This slight shift in 
federalism has demonstrated a willingness to 
further decentralize social policymaking power 
to the provinces and the municipal/urban level, 
which has clearly altered the nature of the 
institutional policymaking process and the 
opportunities for a national-level movement to 
influence social policy in areas that matter to 
women.  We saw a shift even more 
substantively in this direction with the 2014 
Canada Health Accord, where the Harper 
Conservative government unilaterally ‘re-
negotiated’ health care transfers to the 
provinces without obtaining provincial input.  
But instead of increasing federal commitments, 
the 2014 Accord included decreased federal 
health care transfers to the provinces alongside 
the removal of any conditions associated with 
reduced federal funding.
4
 
 
Ideational contexts: The rise of 
neoliberalism and post-neoliberalism 
 After years of frustration and 
deprivation following the Depression and the 
Second World War, Canada was open to the 
advent of a stronger state role in helping to 
alleviate societal ills and to get the country 
back on track economically.  Thus the 
Keynesian welfare state era was born where 
state expansion of social policy helped define 
what would be known as the “golden age” of 
the Canada welfare state (Mahon 2006:1).  
Mahon refers to this era from WWII to the 
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early 1970s as social liberalism where “positive 
freedoms of opportunity and person 
development” were emphasized and state 
involvement in policy areas aimed to help 
citizens “develop their full potential even if this 
involved measures to counteract the impact of 
market forces” (Ibid: 3). Not surprisingly, the 
welfare state grew and federal involvement in 
Medicare and shared cost social programs was 
high during these years. 
 But again, a gradual erosion of these 
ideas began to appear in Canada and other 
Western democracies in the mid-1970s through 
to the 1980s.  Eventually states began to adopt 
a neoliberal approach to the welfare state where 
less state involvement and reduced public 
spending was encouraged to essentially free up 
the market economy from the dangers of a 
culture of welfare state dependence (Kendall 
2003).  By the late 1980s and into the 1990s, 
the federal Canadian government had largely 
adopted a neoliberal approach to social policy-
making and this approach informed both 
Conservative and Liberal government decisions 
to download fiscal responsibility for social 
program delivery to the provincial/municipal 
levels of government and to refocus national 
attention on debt and deficit reduction (Collier 
2008).   
 By the mid-1990s many Western 
democracies began to soften this more 
draconian approach to welfare-state reduction 
and began to selectively re-invest in the welfare 
state.  This new openness to selective welfare 
state reinvestment has been alternatively 
referred to as post-neoliberalism or “the social 
investment state” - “a hybrid welfare regime, 
combining elements of liberal and social-
democratic welfare regimes” (Lister 2004 
quoted in 2006:1).
5
  Although still informed by 
neoliberalism in that it aimed to integrate 
citizens into the market as opposed to 
protecting them from it, the social investment 
state remained different from the Keynesian 
social democratic welfare state that preceded it, 
but was not as closed to social program 
delivery as neoliberalism had been.  Any state 
investment, therefore, continued to uphold 
market values such as managerialism and 
program efficiency and was measured by how 
well it improved state competitiveness, 
particularly by promoting increased labour 
market productivity (Jenson and Saint-Martin 
2003).  Associated with these goals was an 
emphasis on gender-neutral frames to justify 
new social investment state policy.  Thus, for 
example, post-neoliberal child care investments 
were framed as “children’s” issues instead of 
“women’s” issues and emphasized the benefits 
of investing in children instead of in working 
toward feminist goals of gender equality 
(Dobrowolsky and Jenson 2004).  The state’s 
tendency to gender-neutralize very gendered 
areas of policy was not confined to the welfare 
state alone.  Over time neoliberalism and post-
neoliberalism also dampened the state’s 
willingness to address criminal and legal 
equality issues of particular interest to women.
6
  
In the end, the shifting ideational context of 
social policymaking had the potential to 
negatively alter the impact of women’s 
movement actors such as NAC, particularly as 
the state lost sight of the importance of a 
gender-based policy approach.  It is to an 
analysis of NAC’s ability to influence the state 
and, on a more basic level, to continue to 
function, that the paper will now turn. 
 Table 1 gives a brief overview of some 
of the key dates in the evolution of NAC from 
its inception in 1972 to 2012.  NAC was 
created in response to the Report of the Royal 
Commission on the Status of Women in 1970 
in order to lobby Canadian governments to 
implement the 167 recommendations in the 
Report.  It was structured as an umbrella 
organization incorporating member pro-
feminist equality groups from across the 
country.  As such, individuals were not directly 
members of NAC but were so through 
affiliation with specific, smaller scale equality 
member groups.  NAC received most of its core 
funding from the federal government and 
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operated as a non-profit advocacy organization 
promoting women’s equality across Canada. 
 For the purposes of this article, I will 
begin my analysis of NAC at arguably its 
highest point of strength as a representative of 
the women’s movement and in its ability to 
impact the state, specifically with respect to 
social policymaking at the federal level.
7
  I will 
also highlight the relevant changes in the 
federal policy-making context and the 
ideational social policy framework as indicators 
of the shifting political opportunity structure 
from this time-point (mid-1980s) to today.  As 
mentioned, this will not explain all of the ups 
and downs in NAC’s development, nor will it 
provide a complete picture of the political 
opportunities available to it at particular time-
points.  It will, however, help highlight two of 
the main structural reasons for NAC’s decline 
and eventual demise. 
 I start my analysis of NAC in the 1980s 
when NAC had arguably its strongest influence 
on the Canadian state.  This can be seen in the 
lead up to the patriation of the Constitution in 
1982 when NAC lobbied the Trudeau Liberal 
government to include key gender equality 
concessions in the Constitution Act, notably in 
Sections 15 and 28 of the Charter of Rights and 
Freedoms.
8
  Additionally, 1984 can be seen as a 
high point in the Canadian women’s movement 
when NAC hosted the first televised leaders 
debate on women’s issues for a federal election 
campaign.  Even though attempts were made to 
repeat this feat in at least two other election 
campaigns, they were either relegated to 
broadcast on CPAC, involved a mix of federal 
leaders and “other” lesser party representatives, 
or suffered from last minute withdrawals from 
confirmed party attendees.
9
  By contrast, the 
1984 debate was a nationally-televised event 
involving all three federal party leaders and for 
many it marked a watershed moment for NAC 
in its role as the leading representative of the 
national women’s movement (Carmichael 
2004b, Rundle 1999).  Fiscal-federal 
relationships between the national and 
provincial levels of government were still 
mainly centralized at a point in time when 
collaborative federalism was just beginning.  
Any major changes to intergovernmental 
shared cost arrangements were still 
approximately 5 years away and NAC and the 
women’s movement still had open 
opportunities to influence federal action in this 
arena.  Sue Findlay notes that the state was 
committed during these years to consulting 
with Canadian women regularly (in Vickers, et. 
al 1993:53).  While neoliberal ideas were 
beginning to take hold in the United States and 
the UK, Canada was still being governed by a 
more centrist federal Liberal Party which 
remained, for the time being at least, relatively 
committed to the welfare state and open to 
consideration of women’s equality rights.  
Ironically, even though NAC was a prominent 
player during the 1984 federal election the 
winning party, the Progressive Conservatives 
under Brian Mulroney, eventually began to 
more fully embrace a neoliberal approach to the 
welfare state, although the effects of this 
restructuring were not fully felt until a different 
Liberal government took office in the early 
1990s. 
 Before the Mulroney Conservatives left 
office, however, they dealt the first serious 
blow to NAC as an organization in 1989 by 
cutting its federal Secretary of State program 
funding in half.  According to Chappell, “the 
election of the Mulroney government 
essentially disrupted the existing positive POS 
[political opportunity structure] and replaced it 
with a set of political constraints” (2002:35).  
The greatest of these arguably was the full 
adoption of neoliberal policies and an 
exclusionary approach to the women’s 
movement, preferring to see its advocacy 
agenda as a list of “special interests” (Sawer 
2006:127).  According to Janine Brodie, this 
willingness to view the women’s movement as 
falling outside of normal politics eventually led 
to a “disappearance of the gendered subject”, “a 
process of invisibilization beg[inning] with the 
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delegitimization of women’s groups”, and 
ultimately to a “dismantling of  much of the 
gender-based policy capacity within the federal 
government” – a process that accelerated in the 
1990s (Brodie 2008). 
  
 
 
Table One: The Evolution of NAC
10
 
 Table 1 - Summary of Selected Key Dates in the Life of NAC 
1970 The Royal Commission on the Status of Women released its report 
1972 The National Action Committee on the Status of Women was formed to lobby government to implement 
the RCSW recommendations.  It represented 289 member groups. 
1976 NAC met with the Liberal government and opposition parties in the first annual NAC lobby 
1981 NAC’s lobbying efforts help secure equality rights protections in the Charter of Rights and Freedoms 
(1982) 
1980s The federal government provided NAC with approximately 90% of its overall budget 
1984 NAC organized the first (and only) televised leaders debate on women’s issues for a federal election 
campaign.  It was nationally televised in prime-time and was a major milestone for the women’s 
movement 
1986 NAC grew from 289 to 458 member organizations 
1987 NAC campaigned against the Meech Lake Constitutional Accord 
1989/90 Secretary of State Women’s Program Funding was drastically cut and NAC’s grant was cut in half 
1992 NAC campaigned against the Charlottetown Constitutional Accord 
1993 Sunera Thobani was elected NAC’s first woman of colour president 
1994 NAC received $270K (27% of its annual budget) from the federal government.  Carried a $60K 
operating deficit 
1995 Internal politics began to divide NAC but NAC grew from 550 to 677 member groups 
1997 Under the leadership of new president Joan Grant-Cummings, NAC’s member organizations rose from 
650 to 730 
1998 Total federal funding to women’s groups shrunk from a high of $13mil in 1989 to $8mil 
1998 NAC lost federal core funding when Status of Women switched to an exclusive project based funding 
program.  NAC began to lay off staff under a cloud of a $100K deficit 
2000 NAC elected its first aboriginal woman president, Terri Brown 
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2001 NAC’s newly elected president, Denise Andrea Campbell, resigned a few weeks after her position was 
announced due in part to NAC’s inability to pay her 
2001/02 NAC did not hold its AGM in ‘01 and ‘02 
2002 NAC laid off all but one of its paid staff members 
2002 The federal government refused NAC’s request for project funding to hold a restructuring conference 
2004 The media reported that NAC was unable to pay staff to answer its phones and its answering machine 
was cut off 
2004 NAC’s website declared that it remained the largest feminist organization in Canada with over 700 
member groups 
2005 NAC was finally granted $150K from Status of Women Canada to fund restructuring conferences and 
consultations titled “How NAC Relates” 
2005 NAC continued to lobby the Canada Revenue Agency for debt forgiveness on $30K it owed in interest 
payments on unpaid taxes 
2006 NAC announced that the majority of women it consulted (over 400) on the “How NAC Relates” project 
expressed a “need for a national equality-seeking organization like NAC” 
2006 NAC elected new president, Dolly Williams, and held its first AGM in 4 years.  Consensus at AGM was 
that NAC should continue on 
2006 NAC continued its restructuring project and announced the intention to be financially self-sufficient by 
encouraging increased donations from individual members 
2006 The federal Conservative government removed the goal of “equality” from the mandate of the Women’s 
Program at Status of Women, and cut $5mil from its operating budget forcing the closure of most of its 
regional and provincial offices.  It also disallowed groups that conducted research or advocacy from 
accessing Status of Women program funding 
2006 The Canadian Labour Congress formally withdrew membership and participation in NAC 
2007 NAC submitted a brief to the House of Commons Standing Committee on the Status of Women’s 
hearings into the “Potential Impact of Recent Funding and Program Changes at Status of Women 
Canada” but is not invited to make a presentation to the committee 
2008 NAC’s website still listed 2001 President Denise Campbell as acting President, contained outdated 
“news” on its lobbying efforts and goals for the 2004 federal election and contained the wrong address 
for its recently located head office in Toronto 
2012 NAC’s website www.nac-cca.ca\ redirected visitors to a site offering the domain name for sale and it no 
longer was listed at its last-known headquarters in Toronto 
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As Table 1 shows, while NAC 
continued to increase its representation among 
member groups to a high of 730 in 1997, it also 
continued to suffer successive cuts in its federal 
funding during this time period.  By 1998 all 
core funding was eliminated and NAC began 
laying off staff under the cloud of a $100,000 
deficit (Rundle 1999).  Although the initial 
decreases in NAC’s funding came during the 
Mulroney Conservative regime, the bulk of the 
cuts occurred under the watch of the federal 
Liberals.  The latter was a party that was once 
very open to women’s movement lobbying but 
over-time absorbed the neoliberal approach to 
state support for women’s issues.11  The 
Liberals proceeded to systematically and 
permanently alter the financial structure of 
NAC, which at one time relied heavily on 
federal funding.  Faced with the daunting task 
of trying to raise core funds through individual 
donations while remaining an umbrella 
organization representing member groups,
12
 
NAC quickly took on a sizable debt and 
struggled to continue acting as an effective 
representative of the Canadian women’s  
movement.  Also during the 1990s, NAC faced 
internal struggles over the effective 
representation of the diversity of women that 
belong to the women’s movement in Canada.  
While a full discussion of these struggles is 
beyond the scope of this paper, these 
difficulties further compounded NAC’s efforts 
to right its ship after successive hits from the 
federal government.
13
 
 At the same time that NAC was 
struggling to survive under a neoliberal state, 
significant decentralizing changes were 
occurring in fiscal-federal delivery mechanisms 
in the social policy arena.  As was mentioned, 
the 1997 introduction of the CHST, which 
replaced the shared cost CAP program with a 
reduced amalgamated lump sum transfer to the 
provinces for health care, education and most 
other social welfare policies, had detrimental 
effects on the political opportunity structure of 
the national level women’s movement.  
Essentially, the ability of the federal 
government to dictate social policy directions 
from the national level, say for example for a 
national child care program, were significantly 
undermined by this shift.  Thus, the provinces 
and relatedly the municipalities inside of the 
provinces, became the main arenas of social 
policymaking and delivery increasing the level 
of diversity across the country and creating 10 
separate provincial and three territorial 
autonomous sites for a national-level women’s 
group to lobby to achieve pro-feminist policy 
change.  As Vickers et. al note, NAC’s 
umbrella national structure was never equipped 
to readily deal with a decentralized federal 
system.  They argued in 1993 that the chapter-
based organization of the National 
Organization of Women in the United States 
“which mobilizes women at the local and state 
levels in ways an umbrella structure cannot, 
might be a better model in a decentralized 
system” (1993:30).  NAC’s umbrella structure 
would be unable to mobilize quickly at the 
provincial/territorial levels and they predicted 
this may hurt the organization if the Canadian 
federation became further decentralized (Ibid) – 
a scenario that increasingly played out in the 
1990s and into the 2000s.  NAC’s ability to 
mobilize women across the country from its 
Toronto headquarters was, unsurprisingly, 
further compounded by its rising debt and loss 
of federal funds throughout the 1990s.  Young 
and Everitt note that almost all of NAC’s 
regional representative positions on its 
executive were vacant in 2003 and had been for 
several years previous (2004:50).  In 1990, 
when the federal government cut women’s 
centre funding across the country, including in 
St. John’s Newfoundland, NAC was unable to 
mount a quick and appropriate response, 
leaving Newfoundland women to fend for 
themselves.  According to NAC’s 
Newfoundland representative during this crisis: 
 
I was almost embarrassed to be the NAC rep.  
Women from St. John’s were calling me and 
asking what was going on.   Weeks were passing, 
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and I remember feeling very torn, because I 
agreed with the women in St. John’s who really 
felt NAC had let them down.  We had about 
twenty-four member groups in our Province at the 
time.  This was one of the biggest fight backs that 
we’d ever had, and where was NAC when we 
needed them? (Joyce Hancock in Rebick 
2005:233). 
 
Clearly, NAC was unprepared to deal with the 
changing nature of federalism inside of the 
political opportunity structure.  As 
decentralized federalism was further 
compounded by neoliberalism and then post-
neoliberalism’s unwillingness to acknowledge 
gender issues, matters grew steadily worse for 
NAC into the 2000s. 
 Again referring to Table 1, we see that 
perhaps the worst of times for NAC came after 
the turn of the century.  Beginning in 2001, 
financial difficulties and compounding debt 
resulted in the premature resignation (only 
weeks after her appointment) of newly-elected 
youth president, Denise Andrea Campbell.  
Campbell reportedly left due in part to the fact 
that NAC was unable to pay her (Habib 
2003:9).  Between 2001 and 2005 NAC fell 
into what one commentator would call “a debt-
imposed five-year exile” (Yuen 2006).  During 
these years, volunteers kept a skeleton of the 
organization together to continue some level of 
lobbying,
14
 meaning that NAC did not 
completely fade away during these years.  
However, it was unable to continue with 
volunteers alone.   
In an effort to save itself from 
eventually disappearing altogether, NAC made 
a submission to Status of Women Canada to 
provide one-time project funding to help it 
reorganize its members and to assess the future 
of NAC.  The first request in 2002 was denied, 
but the federal Liberal government eventually 
agreed to fund a restructuring consultation 
project called “How NAC Relates” in 2005.  
Liberal MP Hedy Fry, who was Status of 
Women Minister at the time that NAC’s core 
funding was cut, was sceptical of NAC’s ability 
to regroup, suggesting a new national women’s 
group may need to be created instead.  “We 
need to bring in women from all walks of life 
who can feel that they belong to an 
organization that speaks for all of them,” she 
said.  “Do we need a new vehicle to do it?  I 
think we might” (in Carmichael 2004b: 3). 
 Armed with the new Status of Women 
funding, NAC held consultations with over 400 
women and equality-seeking women’s groups 
to establish whether or not a national women’s 
group was still necessary in the current political 
context.  Plenary sessions considered three 
different options: 
 
1. The renewal of NAC, with a review of NAC’s 
present structure, policies and by-laws. 
 
2. The shutting down of NAC, with NAC and its 
members simultaneously taking action to found a 
new national equality-seeking women’s 
organization to take its place. 
 
3. The shutting down of NAC, without NAC and its 
members taking action to found a new national 
equality-seeking women’s organization to take 
its place (PAR-L Archives, Mar. 2006, wk1: 57). 
 
The majority of those consulted agreed that 
there was still a need for a national women’s 
organization and therefore both options 1 and 2 
were to be put to a vote at the NAC AGM in 
May 2006 (Ibid).  At the AGM, NAC 
announced its plans to continue on, reaffirming 
option 1, and electing a new executive director, 
Dolly Williams, to lead its reconstruction. A 
key part of that reconstruction involved a shift 
in funding to rely more heavily on donations 
from individual members (Yuen 2006).  While 
many were sceptical of NAC’s ability to secure 
enough donations and be able to rebuild its 
representational base (compounding this was 
the fact that no Quebec women were in 
attendance at a subsequent September 2006 
restructuring meeting), there was renewed hope 
that NAC could rise from the ashes after years 
of virtual invisibility on the political scene 
(Ibid). 
Canadian Political Science Review Vol. 8, No.2, 2014, 17-33 
 
28 
 
 However, a look at the political 
opportunity structure since 2006 explains why 
this renewal never happened.  As mentioned 
above, the Harper Conservative government 
elected early in 2006 was determined to further 
decentralize the federal system (under open 
federalism) going further than any previous 
federal regime in the past.  Alongside the 
unwillingness of the federal government to 
interfere with provincial jurisdiction in areas of 
social policy - demonstrated clearly with the 
2014 Health Care Accord as well as Harper’s 
particular interpretation of a national “child 
care” policy15 - was a return to a stronger 
neoliberal approach to women’s interests and 
the welfare state, further denying the relevance 
of gender in policymaking and further 
demonizing the Canadian women’s 
movement.
16
  In 2006, the Conservatives 
removed the goal of “equality” from the 
mandate of the Women’s Program under Status 
of Women, cut $5 million from its operating 
budget thus forcing the closure of most of its 
regional and provincial offices and disallowed 
women’s organizations involved in research or 
advocacy to access SWC program funding.  
According to Alexandra Dobrowolsky, the 
Harper government thus “swiftly swept away 
the last vestiges of the status of women 
machinery in this country and did its best to 
wipe out any other avenues for equality seeking 
by the women’s movement.  As a result, the 
women’s movement’s multilevel action 
coordination and its capability to be a 
signifying agent have been seriously and 
negatively affected” (2008:172).  Apparently, 
some long-time members of NAC’s coalition 
agreed.  The Canadian Labour Congress made 
the decision to formally withdraw “its 
membership and participation from NAC” in 
2006.  Shortly thereafter, other members of the 
labour movement, including PSAC, followed 
suit (Bromley and Ahmad 2007:69, note 15). 
 Clearly, political opportunities for NAC 
had all but dried up.  In 2007, NAC attempted 
to be heard during the House of Commons 
Standing Committee on the Status of Women’s 
hearings into the “Potential impact of recent 
funding and program changes at Status of 
Women Canada,” but was only allowed to 
make a one-page submission to the committee 
and was not invited to make a formal 
presentation (Ratansi 2007).  In 2008, NAC’s 
website was ostensibly abandoned, listing 
Denise Campbell as its “current” president 
(although she left after two weeks in 2001), 
containing “current” news on the upcoming 
2004 election campaign and the incorrect 
address for its recently re-located head office in 
Toronto.  The 2007 “Ad Hoc Coalition for 
Equality and Human Rights” formed to fight 
for “women’s rights at the federal level in 
Canada,” did not list NAC as one of its 
coalition members.
17
  A visit to NAC’s website 
address in 2012 redirected users to an alternate 
site offering the domain name for sale.  
According to Rodgers and Knight, NAC 
continued to exist in name and as a registered 
charity in 2011 (2011: 575), but in reality the 
once mighty representative for women’s voices 
across the country was effectively silenced.   
 
Conclusion 
 
 At times in Canada the political 
opportunities for the successful establishment 
and operation of a national feminist women’s 
movement were very positive.  Particularly as 
the federal government expanded its role in the 
welfare state under a broad political framework 
of social liberalism intent on building a solid 
social safety net for Canadian citizens, it is easy 
to see how a national umbrella organization of 
member groups from across the country could 
be created to promote women’s rights and 
equality.  It is even not too difficult to imagine 
a time when the federal government would be 
open to debating women’s issues on the 
national stage during an election campaign, 
believing that the federal government had the 
right and duty to establish strong national social 
policy in areas of concern for women and that 
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those areas of concern were important enough 
to view through a gendered lens.  Yet changes 
in the fiscal-federal social policymaking 
framework from one that was more centralized 
to one that was quite decentralized and willing 
to download responsibility for social program 
delivery to sub-state levels of government, 
changed the lobbying landscape for a national 
women’s group.  How could a group effectively 
lobby the federal state for universal social 
programs when this was the last thing the 
federal state was willing to entertain as it would 
circumvent provincial responsibility and would 
upload successfully downloaded fiscal pressure 
back onto the national level?  At the same time, 
a shift toward the neoliberal and post-neoliberal 
state that for the most part was more interested 
in retrenchment of welfare expenditures instead 
of new investments meant that women’s 
movement lobbying would fall on largely deaf 
ears.  Compounding this was a tendency to 
ignore the importance of gender altogether, 
which led to a discrediting of the women’s 
movement and unwillingness to see gender 
inside of policy circles.  With such a negative 
institutional and ideational opportunity 
structure, it is not surprising that NAC faltered 
in the 2000s and eventually ceased to exist. 
 This leaves one to ponder the state of 
the national level women’s movement in 
Canada, beyond NAC.  Clearly any nationally 
focussed equality-seeking feminist organization 
would face the same challenges as NAC when 
it comes to the negative political opportunity 
structure currently in place.  What can those 
organizations do to circumvent this negative 
POS or to try to change it as Chappell has 
indicated as a possibility (2002:27)?  Vickers  
et al, suggest the answer may lie in a different 
type of national level organization that is better 
able to mobilize members at the provincial and 
local levels, more in the mould of the American 
NOW (1993).  This would help tackle the 
change in federalism and the fact that a national 
level organization today must be able to lobby 
separate provincial, territorial and municipal 
levels of government, as each sub-state level’s 
importance in social policymaking continues to 
rise.  As far as the neoliberal and post-
neoliberal state is concerned, I have argued 
elsewhere that there are more opportunities to 
penetrate this ideational framework with left-
wing regimes at the provincial level.  Although 
these regimes have not fully escaped neoliberal 
and post-neoliberal external pressures, they 
have been more willing to see gender in social 
policymaking and have traditionally been more 
open to women’s movement lobbying than 
parties of the center or right (Collier 2008 & 
2009).   
 In the end, it is unlikely that a national 
women’s organization similar to the size and 
influence of NAC during its heyday would be 
able to overcome the challenges of the current 
Canadian political opportunity structure.  
According to one feminist activist participating 
in Rodger and Knight’s 2011 study of the 
Canadian women’s movement, NAC’s 
disappearance, in particular, has left a huge 
hole in the national level movement: 
  
NAC nurtured a certain kind of feminist or strong 
woman leadership and what’s fostering that now?  
I don’t know that there is anything that’s fostering 
that now (quoted in 2011:576). 
 
Whether or not NAC or any national level 
feminist women’s movement organization can 
reinvent itself in such a way in order to meet 
the challenges of the current POS in Canada, 
remains to be seen.  But until that hole is filled, 
the Canadian women’s movement will in all 
likelihood remain an ineffective player in 
national level politics. 
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Endnotes: 
 
1
 See for example, “The Death of Official Feminism” Ottawa Citizen, February 20, 2005, C.2. 
2
 See for example, Campbell 2002 and Skogstad 2005. 
3
 This was split into the Canada Social Transfer and the Canada Health Transfer in 2004 but was not significantly 
altered to reflect greater federal expenditure levels (see Collier 2008). 
4
 This contrasts sharply to the previous Health Accord negotiated by the federal Liberals under Paul Martin in 2004 
which tied federal funding to specific health care goals such as wait times guarantees (Norquay 2011). 
5
 Note that some authors argue that this is not necessarily a departure from neoliberal practice (see Mahon 2009). 
6
 See for example the Harper government’s unwillingness to launch a national inquiry into missing and murdered 
Indigenous women in 2014 and the lack of feminist consultation during redrafting of prostitution legislation in 2013-
2014. 
7
 It’s important to note here that I am largely focussing on NAC’s work influencing policy on behalf of the English 
Canadian women’s movement or the movement outside of Quebec.  As the Quebec women’s movement, 
represented largely by the FFQ, has tied its equality-seeking advocacy work intersectionally to the cause of 
Québécois nationalism and has achieved more success in this advocacy by largely lobbying exclusively at the 
provincial level, much of its interests get left out of an analysis that focuses on NAC’s lobbying efforts made toward 
the national government.  Issues of fiscal-federalism and national influence in areas of provincial jurisdiction take on 
new and trickier meanings with respect to francophone feminists in Quebec.  This diversity has also plagued NAC in 
its efforts to fully represent all women in Canada (see Vickers, et. al 1993 for more).  It is beyond the scope of this 
more limited analysis to deal with this aspect of the Canadian women’s movement, although I certainly do not 
discount its importance overall. 
8
 The Liberals had not initially considered women’s equality rights until concerted lobbying efforts by NAC during 
the lead up to patriation.  For more see for example Rebick 2005. 
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9
 In 2000, NAC organized a leaders debate on women’s issues with 3 out of the 5 leaders confirmed to appear.  In 
the end all parties ended up sending other representatives to the debate, with the NDP deciding not to send its leader 
Alexa McDonough only the night before the debate was scheduled (See PAR-L Archives, November 2000, week 3 
(#47).  See Lisa Young (2000:79) for a similar attempt in 1997 which McDonough actually attended as the sole 
representative of party leaders. 
10
 Sources: Landsberg 1997; Rundle 1999; PAR-L Archives (June 2000, wk2; January 2003, wk4; March 2006; 
wk1); Habib 2003; Carmichael 2004a and 2004b and 2005; Canada NewsWire 2006; Yuen 2006; Status of Women 
Canada 2007; Bromley and Ahmad 2007; www.nac-cca.ca (accessed May 2008 and July 2012). 
 
11
 Elsewhere I have argued that different party governments at the provincial level have adopted neoliberal policy 
approaches to various extents with left wing governments generally being better placed to resist neoliberal pressures 
to a certain extent (see Collier 2008).  However, left-wing parties (such as the NDP) have not been successful at the 
national level in Canada and there has been less variation between Liberal and Conservative party approaches on 
this point.  I do discuss some smaller variants in federal party approaches, but note that these can be summarized 
under neoliberal and post-neoliberal labels and shifts between the two ideational frameworks correspond to different 
party governments in power at the national level  (see Collier 2009). 
12
 Arguably, NAC’s umbrella structure itself was an institutional constraint hampering NAC’s ability to adapt to the 
quickly changing neoliberal environment. 
13
 For more on these internal struggles see Vickers et. al 1993, Dobrowolsky 2007 and Young 2000. 
14
 One example was a letter from NAC VP Kripa Sekhar to Prime Minister Chrètien dated February 6, 2002 voicing 
concerns regarding a recent cabinet shuffle which decreased the number of women in cabinet and reassigned the 
Status of Women portfolio (PAR-L Archives, Feb. 2002, wk1:31). 
15
 For more on the Conservative’s universal child care benefit and child care space initiatives and how they failed to 
come close to lobbying requests from the Canadian child care movement, see Collier and Mahon 2008.  Also see the 
2006-2007 Departmental Performance Report of Status of Women Canada which clearly states SWC’s desire to 
work closely with its provincial and territorial counterparts because it believed that “policy areas of concern to 
women are the responsibility of provincial and territorial governments” (SWC 2007:12). 
16
 This wasn’t confined to areas of social policy which are shared with or in many cases were the sole responsibility 
of the provinces.  It arguably also was evident in policy areas of importance to women that fell under sole federal 
responsibility, including criminal law, economic policy, employment insurance and immigration.  A good example 
in the area of criminal law is the federal Conservative government’s proposed reforms to Prostitution legislation 
(Bill 36) forced onto its agenda by the Supreme Court 2013 Bedford decision.  During the 2014 committee hearings 
for Bill 36, women’s groups and feminist perspectives were not well represented.  For more see MacCharles 2014. 
17
 The Ad Hoc Coalition listed other equality groups such as CRIAW, FAFIA and the Child Care Advocacy 
Association of Canada as coalition members (www.womensequality.ca). 
